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FIRST DAY SECTION ONE 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia July 29, 1975 
1. Your client, Sam Driver, brings to you a motion for judg-
ment which was filed and served on him on July 17, 1975, the body 
of which reads as follows: 
lo The piaintiff, Roscoe Fleetwood, has duly quali-
fied as administrator of the estate of Jim Wallace, de-
ceased, in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville, 
on the 8th day of' July, 1975. 
2. Plaintiff moves the Court for a judgment against 
the defendant Sam Driver for the sum of $75,830 for the 
wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent caused by the said 
defendant in that said defendant did negligently operate a 
motor vehicle between Rugby Road and Vinegar Hill, in the 
City of Charlottesville, Virginia, causing said motor 
vehicle to strike and kill plaintiff's decedent who was 
crossing Rugby Road. 
Driver has fi~ed a demurrer to the motion for judgment. 
How should the Court rule on the demurrer? 
2. Jane Horseman commenced an action against Horse Van Carrier, 
Inc. in the Circuit Court of Clarke County, Virginia, to recover dam-
ages in the sum of $100,000 for serious personal injuries sustained 
by plaintiff as a result of a collision between a car operated by her 
and a horse van operated by the defendant. l~t the conclusion.of 
all of the evidence and after receiving the instructions of the Court, 
counsel for plaintiff and defendant argued the case. During the 
course of argument counsel for plaintiff said to the jury: "All Jane 
Horseman asks you gentlemen to do when you retire to your jury room 
is to apply the Golden Rule - 'Do unto her as you wish that you would 
be done.'" Counsel for defendant promptly objected to that statement 
by counsel for the plaintiff and, out of the hearing of the jury, 
moved the Court to declare a mistrial, or in lieu thereof instruct 
the jury to disregard the argument as improper. The Court overruled 
the motion for a mistrial, holding that the argument was proper. The 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $65,000. 
Shortly thereafter counsel for defendant moved the trial court to set 
the verdict aside claiming that the Court erred in overruling de-
fendant's motion for a mistrial, or, in the alternative,in failing to 
instruct the jury to disregard the argument as improper. The trial 
court overruled the motion and exception was noted. Defendant filed 
a petition with the Supreme Court of Virginia for a writ of error and 




the Court in refusing to grant a mistrial, or, in lieu thereof, in 
failing to instruct the jury to disregard the argument as improper. 
Should the Supreme Court affirm the trial court 
or reverse that Court and remand the case for a 
new trial? 
3. William Houseman, a citizen of Tennessee, on May 7, 1975, 
sued John Gardener, a citizen of Virginia, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia, to obtain specific 
performance of an allege<! contract for the sale of a farm, "Green 
Acres," which was owned\by Gardener and was situate in Albemarle 
County, Virginia, and to recover damages in the sum of $25,000 for 
the alleged breach of the contract by Gardener. Gardener filed an 
answer in which he merely denied the averments contained in the com-
plaint, i.e., he denied that he entered into a contract with Houseman 
by which he agreed to sell the farm, "Green Acres," and he further 
denied that he was guilty of a breach of contract, as charged in the 
complaint, which would entitle Houseman to recover damages. No other 
pleadings were filed by the plaintiff or defendant. During the trial 
of the case Houseman proved: that on May 5, 1971, he and Gardener. 
orally agreed that Gardener would sell to Houseman "Green Acres" for 
the sum of $150,000; that a deed for the farm would be delivered to 
Houseman by Gardener the 1st day of June, 1971, and that the purchase 
price would be paid on the date of delivery of the deed; that Gardener 
refused to deliver a deed for the farm on June 1, 1971, as agreed, 
although Houseman then tendered payment of $150,000 to Gardener by 
certified check; that on a number of occasions thereafter Houseman 
demanded that Gardener deliver him a deed and accept payment of the 
purchase price but Gardener refused in each instance; and that House-
man had sustained a loss of $25,000 because he had been denied pos-
session of the farm and was unaLle to make a profit from the opera-
tion thereof. At the conclusion of the evidence offered by Houseman, 
Gardener moved the Court for summary judgment on the grounds (a) that 
the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (b) that the 
contract was oral and therefore unenforceable because of the statute 
of frauds. 
How should the Court rule on each ground of the 
motion? 
4. Jimmy Q-iriyaway was indicted in the Circuit Court of Prince 
William County, Virginia, on a charge of breaking and entering with 
the intent to commit larceny. Promptly upon the return of the indict-
ment, Carryaway was arraigned on the indictment and entered a plea of 
not guilty. He was tried on the indictment at the next regular 
term of the Court, was found guilty and sentenced to five years in 
the state penitentiary. After serving one year in the state peniten-
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tiary, Carryaway, by his attorney, filed a petition in the Circuit 
Court of Prince William County praying that a writ of habeas corpus 
be issued and that he be discharged from custody. In his petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus Carryaway charged that during the trial 
on the indictment the Court erred in admitting, over his objection, 
the result of a lie detector test, and that the Court also, over his 
objection, admitted into evidence hearsay evidence that was material 
in establishing his guilt of the offense charged in the indictment. 
At the hearing on the petition, the petitioner proved that he had 
submitted to a lie detector test and that the result tended to prove 
his guilt. He also proved that the witness introduced by the Com-
monwealth was permitted to testify that he heard Joe Booze say that 
he saw the defendant open a closed window of the house that he was 
charged with entering and that he saw him enter the house and return 
through the window with some valuable silverware. The petitioner 
also proved at that hearing that his attorney strongly objected to 
the admission of all of that evidence, and that the Court overruled 
the objection. The Commonwealth offered no evidence at the hearing 
on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. 
On a motion by the Attorney for the Commonwealth 
to strike the petitioner's evidence and to deny 
the writ of habeas corpus, hew should the Court 
rule? 
5. Herbert Nickels obtained a judgment for $5,000 against 
Robert Payne in the Circuit Court of Mathews County, Virginia. Robert 
Payne and his brother John were tenants in conunon of sixty acres of 
timberland in Mathews County which realty had a fair market value of 
$30,000. Shortly after his judgment was docketed, Nickels brought a 
suit in equity in the Circuit Court of Mathews County against Robert 
and John Payne to partition the timberland. The bill recited the 
judgment against Robert Payne, recited that Robert and John Payne were 
tenants in common of the timberland, recited that rents and profits 
from the timberland would not satisfy the lien of the judgment within 
five years, prayed that the timberland be partitioned by sale, and 
further prayed that Nickels' judgment be satisfied out of that portion 
of the sale price allotted to Robert Payne. After the parties were at 
issue, a stipulation was entered into and filed in the cause by 
Nickels, Robert Payne and John Payne. By the stipulation, it was 
agreed that Robert Payne had marketable personal property in Mathews 
County worth $6,000. John Payne thereupon filed a motion that the 
Court dismiss Nickelsg bill for partition asserting as the grounds 
therefor: (a) that Nickels was not entitled to relief by a partition 
of the timberland until he had exhausted his remedy to satisfy his 
judgment out of the personal property of Robert Payne, and (b} that 
Nickels could not properly proceed to satisfy his judgment by par-
tition of the timberland because John Payne was a co-owner of the 
realty and was not a debtor of Nickels. 
Should the Court sustain John Payne's motion on 
either,or both, of the grounds asserted? 
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6. Top-Service Taxi Corp. is engaged in business in the City 
of Richmond. Top-Service employs no drivers and owns no taxicabs, 
but receives orders for service from prospective passengers. It 
puts its sign "Top-Service Taxi Corp." on cabs which are owned and 
operated by independent drivers, each of whom pays Top-Service a 
mileage fee for each passenger Top-Service refers to the driver. 
After receiving a telephone call for cab service from Cecil Jones, 
Top-Service caused one of the independent drivers to pick him up. 
While transporting Jones, the driver carelessly collided with 
Walter Brown's automobile, damaging it and seriously injuring Jones. 
What liability, if any, does Top-Service have for: 
(a) the injuries to Jones; and 
(b) the damage to Brown's automobile. 
7. John Lacy is a resident of Knoxville. Tennessee, and is 
the owner of approximately 5,000 acres of land situated in the New 
River Valley in the State of Virginia. In 1973 the General Assembly 
of Virginia enacted a statute authorizing the State Engineer to 
construct a dam on New River at a point one mile downstream from 
the land of Lacy, the completed dam to be of such height as to flood 
more than one-half of Lacy's land. The construction of the dam has 
been completed and Lacy 7 s land has been flooded. Although demanded 
by Lacy, the Treasurer of the State of Virginia has refused to pay 
Lacy for resulting damage on the ground that the statute makes nq 
provision for compensation to those adversely affected by the dam. 
Lacy has brought an action against the Treasurer and the State of 
Virginia in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Virginiao His complaint alleges the foregoing faats, and seeks 
damages in the amount of $300,000. The Treasurer and the State of 
Virginia have moved to dismiss Lacy's complaint on the ground that 
it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
How should the Court rule on the motion? 
8. Thomas Swan rented a safety box in the vault of First State 
Bank in the City of Fairfax. On December 27, 1974 Swan went to the 
Bank to deposit stock certificates in his safety box. After being 
admitted to the vault, and after depositing his certificates, Swan 
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found lying on the floor of the vault a negotiable bearer bond of 
the City of Richmond in the face amount of $5,000 payable on June 
30, 19810 Swan picked up the bond and, seeing it did not recite the 
name of the owner, left th!= vault and went directly to the office of 
the President of the Bank.· There he told the President what had oc-
curred, and delivered the bond to the President only after being 
promised by the latter that, should the owner not call for the bond 
or become known by June 30, 1975, the Bank would redeliver the bond 
to Swan. On July 1, 1975, Swan learned that the owner of the bond 
had not called for it or become known to the Bank. Swan then asked 
that the bond be returned to him. The Bank refused to do so, saying 
it would continue to hold the bond until it learned the identity of 
the owner. Swan has now brought an action in detinue against the 
Bank in the Circuit Court of the City of Fairfax to recover possession 
of the bond. The President of the Bank consults you and, after re-
citing the foregoing facts, asks whether the Bank has the right to 
retain possession of the bond. 
What should your advice be? 
9. Delta Construction Company entered into a contract in July 
1974 to erect a building for Grove Department Store for $100,000 to 
be paid when the building was completed. The contract contained a_ 
binding provision requiring that any disputes between the parties 
would be submitted to arbitration. By May 15, 1975, Delta had com-
pleted fifty percent of the work on the building. At that time a 
dispute arose regarding subsurface conditions. Delta w3lked off the 
project and refused to participate in arbitration. Shortly there-
after Third Party secured a judgment against Delta for $10,000. When 
Delta failed to pay the judgment, Third Party sought to collect it 
from Grove through a garnishment proceeding on the theory that Delta 
would be entitled to collect considerably more from Grove than the 
$10,000 Delta owed Third Party. 
Is Third Party entitled to collect $10,000 
from Grove in the garnishment proceeding? 
10. Paul alleged in his bill of complaint filed in the Circuit 
Court of Warren County, Virginia, that he had entered into a "sup-
posed marriage" with Winona upon her representation that she had 
been lawfully divorced from her former husband, Joe: that following 
the ceremony, and in the honest belief that they were lawfully mar-
ried, Paul purchased certain real property in Warren County and 
caused it to be conveyed to him and his supposed wife as tenants by 
the entirety with the right of survivorship; that subsequently he 
learned that Winona had not been lawfully divorced from her former 
husband; and that although she had obtained a decree of divorce from 
her former husband in the Circuit Court of Henry County, Virginia, 
that decree was void for want of jurisdiction because neither Winona 
nor her husband had been domiciled in, or a bona fide resident of, 
the State of Virginia for at least six months next preceding the 
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commencement of the suit as required by the Virginia Code. Paul 
prayed that the "supposed marriage" be declared a nullity and that 
Winona be compelled to convey to him all of her interest in the 
real property. 
Winona filed a demurrer in which she asserted that Paul's 
suit against her was a collateral attack on the decree of divorce 
by the Circuit Court of Henry County and that Paul had no legal right 
to make such an attack since he was a stranger to the divorce pro-
ceedings. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer and entered a decree 
dismissing the complaint. 
In an appeal by Paul, how should the Supreme Court 
of Virginia rule? 
